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THE KENYA NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION (KNDR) 
MONITORING PROJECT
∗
 
 
AGENDA ITEM 1 
IMMEDIATE ACTION TO STOP VIOLENCE AND RESTORE 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 
 
Report on Status of Implementation 
January 2009  
 
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
 
1. This report assesses the progress made in implementing Agenda Item 1 of the 
Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation process (Immediate Action to Stop 
Violence and Restore Fundamental Rights and Liberties). Data on which this 
report is based was collected using a mix of methods. The baseline survey and 
field data are based on people’s perceptions about implementation of the KNDR 
agenda points. The following are some of the highlights on findings. 
 
2. Demobilisation and disbandment of the militia: From the outset, in February 
2008, the mediation process emphasised the need to demobilise and disband 
illegal armed groups and militias. From March 2008, the police and the military 
began an operation to stop the activities of the Sabaot Land Defence Force 
(SLDF) and later the Mungiki and other groups that had been armed and 
mobilised for violence. Although the operation largely restored calm in the 
affected areas, sporadic activities by illegal armed groups have been noted. 
Ongoing acts of violence nothwithstanding, results from a December 2008 
national baseline survey show  60% of Kenyans feel that violence from local 
armed groups has decreased and 57% believe that this violence will decrease 
further in the next one year. However, there are grave concens about the manner 
in which the police dealt with these groups. Human rights abuses in the course 
of police operations have undermined the confidence of Kenyans in the security 
apparatus.  
 
3. More importantly, no formal process to demobilise and disband illegal armed 
groups has been put in place. The national baseline survey shows that 67% of 
Kenyans believe illegal armed groups have not been completely disbanded or 
demobilised. Although the various militia have not been active, they are alive 
and well in different parts of the country.  Local militia, therefore, remain a 
security threat as dormant groups can be reactivated with ease should political 
circumstances so require. 
 
 
                                                
∗ *Supported by a grant from Foundation Open Society Institute (Zug) 
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4. Enhancing security and protection of the population: Although police claim a 
six percentage reduction in the rate of crime from the previous year
1
, insecurity 
persists in the flashpoints of violence.  The government has established extra 
police stations, posts and patrol bases in areas prone to violence and in particular 
in areas from which the current internally displaced persons were evicted. This 
notwithstanding, attacks and threats against IDPs living close by continue. This 
suggests that ‘policing’ communities is not enough to guarantee their security. 
Other reforms that address the fundamental causes of the post-election violence 
must be undertaken to lay the basis for the security of the population. The 
baseline survey reveals that only 28% of the respondents feel safer now than just 
after the 2007 elections. 
 
5. Restoring fundamental rights and liberties of peaceful assembly: In January 
2009, the international NGO, Freedom House, reported Kenya’s democracy 
rating to have deteroriated from “free” to “partly free.” The fundamental rights, 
freedoms and liberties of Kenyans -- especially with regard to peaceful assembly 
-- continued to be curtailed throughout the year. The police violently dispersed 
public gatherings and demonstrations, including those of IDPs protesting over 
insecurity, citizens campaigning to have Members of Parliament pay tax on their 
allowances, and the media demanding a review of the Kenya Communications 
Amendment Act. Over 60% of the respondents in the baseline survey felt that 
the government did not respect basic human rights. On the whole, fundamental 
rights and freedoms are constrained; democracy is on recession compared to the 
period between 2003 and 2007. 
 
6. Implementation of the CIPEV report: The coalition Government has made some 
progress in initiating implementation of the report by the Commission of Inquiry 
into Post-Election Violence. The coalition partners signed the agreement to set 
up the Special Tribunal for Kenya. Although the Cabinet and Parliament have 
adopted the report, Parliament failed to meet the deadline for passing laws to set 
up the Special Tribunal that would try those suspected to bear the greatest 
responsibility for the post-election violence. Commitment to the implementation 
of the report and to  deal with impunity will depend on the political environment 
at the time that suspects are charged. 
 
7. There are several challenges around implementation of the CIPEV 
recommendations. Firstly, both parties did not have internal consensus on how 
to implement the recommendations in the commission’s report. Divisions and 
disagreements on different aspects of the recommendations are likely to 
negatively affect implementation. Secondly, some of the prosecution witnesses 
have reportedly received threats to dissuade them from giving evidence at the 
Special Tribunal. It is likely that some witnesses may decline to give evidence if 
their protection is not guaranteed.  
                                                
1
 Kenya Police, December 2008 
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General conclusion 
 
8. Findings show that there was no systematic approach to disbandment of the 
illegal armed groups. The informal nature of illegally armed groups and the 
failure to establish the members or their sponsors has made it difficult to arrest 
and prosecute them. These groups remain dormant; they can be reactivated with 
ease for purpose of political violence. Many of those involved in violence used 
ordinary tools – the tools they use during peace times. It is unlikely that these 
groups will not be prepared and armed with sophisticated weapons in future 
political violence.  
 
9. Fundamental rights and freedoms are constrained. Democracy is on recession 
compared to the period between 2003 and 2007. There is urgent need to promote 
and safeguard freedoms and fundamental rights. There is need for the coalition 
partners to publicly mobilise support for respect of freedoms and fundamental 
rights at all times. It is important for KNDR members to provide leadership in 
this regard. 
 
10. Comprehensive reforms and promotion of democratic governance is a must. 
Failure to reform would mean another violent conflict – the illegal armed groups 
will not be poorly equipped for any conflict in future.  
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MAIN FINDINGS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
11. The report covers the period between February 2008 and January 2009. It is 
based on primary data, including data from field and key informant interviews as 
well as analysis of secondary data (media and other reports). The report also 
incorporates findings from the national baseline survey. The survey is based on 
perceptions or people’s opinions with regard to the four agenda points of the 
KNDR process. 
 
12. The report covers the following key issues:  
a. Stopping the wave of violence that had gripped the country. 
b. Enhancing the security and protection of the population and its property 
c. Ensuring that freedom of expression, press freedom and the right to peaceful 
assembly are upheld. 
d. Progress in the implementation of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry 
into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV). 
 
13. In February 2008, the Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange 
Democratic Movement (ODM) agreed to take action to stop the wave of 
violence that had gripped the country.
2
 This agreement required the police to act 
in accordance with the Constitution and the law. They were required to perform 
their duties and carry out their responsibilities with “complete impartiality and 
without regard to ethnicity, political persuasion, or other partisan 
consideration.”
3
  
 
14. The agreement emphasised the need for leaders to embrace and preach peaceful 
coexistence of all communities as well as to refrain from irresponsible and 
provocative statements. Local community, religious, political, business and civil 
society leaders were expected to hold joint meetings to promote peace and 
tranquility and to stand up for justice and fairness. 
 
15. All illegal armed groups and militias were to be demobilised and disbanded 
while all youth throughout the country were to desist from participating in acts 
of lawlessness, particularly those leading to harm or loss of human life and 
destruction of property. Further, the victims and those affected by violence were 
asked to exercise restraint and avoid any acts of revenge or retaliation. 
 
16. Fundamental rights and civil liberties had to be restored; the Government was to 
ensure that freedom of expression, press freedom and the right to peaceful 
assembly were upheld. Hate and threatening messages, leaflets, short text 
messages, or any other broadcasts of that nature were to cease forthwith. 
                                                
2‘ Agreed statement on Security issues,’ signed on 1 February 2008  
3 Ibid 
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17. The Government was to enforce law and order to protect life and property. The 
Government was required to protect all Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and 
assist them to return safely to their homes and places of work. Their rights to 
reside anywhere in the country were to be upheld. 
 
18. This report looks at the progress made in implementing the various aspects of 
Agenda Item 1. It also asseses the challenges faced and draws some conclusions. 
 
STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Stopping Violence, Demobilisation and Disbanding of the Militia 
 
19. After signing the National Accord, the Coalition Government began to curb the 
operations of the Mungiki and SLDF – the most prominent illegally armed 
groups in the country at the time. 
 
20.  A military operation dubbed ‘Okoa Maisha,
4
 which began on March 10, 2008 in 
Mt. Elgon District sought to disband and disarm SLDF and curtail its operations 
in the area. The military operation recovered 100 guns, and almost 2,000 rounds 
of ammunition. Over 1,000 suspected SLDF members were arrested.
5
 The 
operation was heavy handed and generated numerous claims of torture of 
civilians by the military.
6
  
 
21.  From April 2008, the police sought to disband Mungiki after members of the 
group held huge demonstrations seeking the release of their leader from prison. 
Several Mungiki leaders were subsequently killed. Some human rights 
organisations observed that the police were targeting the group’s leaders for 
elimination as the war against Mungiki intensified. Mutilated bodies of abducted 
victims were allegedly found in forests and morgues around Nairobi. The Kenya 
Police denied claims that they deliberately targeted the members but human 
rights organisations insisted that the police are responsible for torture, killings 
and dumping the suspects’ bodies.
7
 
 
22. Interviews at the local level throw up the names of illegal armed groups or 
vigilante groups, suggesting their  continued existence:  
                                                
4
 Save lives 
5 “Army withdraws from Mt Elgon amid torture claims”-The Standard, September 2, 2008 
6 See Mountain of Terror, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, 2008; All the Men Have Gone: 
War Crimes in Kenya’s Mt Elgon Conflict, Human Rights Watch, July 2008; Robert Romborah Simiyu, 
Militianisation of resource conflicts: The case of land-based conflict in the Mount Elgon Region of Western 
Kenya, Institute of Security Studies, Monograph 152, October 2008 
7 Interview with an official of Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, January 2009 
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ILLEGALLY ARMED 
GROUP 
ETHNIC GROUP 
ASSOCIATED WITH IT 
AREA OF OPERATION 
Balarget Land Defence Force Kalenjin Molo/Mau area 
Kalenjin Land Defenders Kalenjin Molo/Mau area 
Kalenjin Youths Kalenjin Molo 
Mungiki Mostly Kikuyu Pockets countrywide 
Baghdad boys Luo Kibera 
Siafu Luo  Kibera (Gatwekera area) 
Mayouth or Maboys Mixed ethnic groups but defined 
by criminal nature, age and 
social status 
Most parts of the country 
Bukhungu boys Luhya Kibera 
Labour youth Nubi Kibera 
Kamjesh Mixed ethnic groups but defined 
by criminal nature, age and 
social status. 
Most parts of the country 
People’s Liberation Army Kalenjin Rift valley 
Group of 41 Kalenjin Rift Valley 
Sabaot Land Defence Force Sabaot Mt. Elgon 
Chinkororo Abagusii Kisii  
Mombasa Republican Council Digo but including members from 
the wider Mijikenda tribes 
Kwale (Mulungunipa Forest) 
Taliban Luo Mathare, Huruma, Baba Dogo, 
Kariobangi North and Kariobangi 
South 
Kosovo Luo and Luhya Kibera 
Kebago Kisii Kisii 
Sungu Sungu Kisii Nyanza Province 
*Table showing illegally armed groups existing as at December 29, 2008. Data collected from field 
research. 
 
23. The proliferation of these armed groups can be attributed – at least in part – to 
the failure to arrest, prosecute and punish their members and/or sponsors. 
 
24. Respondents repeatedly said that most of these groups were formed quickly to 
protect their respective communities and localities. According to some 
respondents, youth organised themselves along ethnic lines to fight rival 
communities. They had no names, no formal organisation, and no plans for self-
perpetuation.
8
 In many instances, there was no use of conventional weapons; 
people were using the tools they use during peace times e.g. implements for 
tilling their land. After the post-election violence, the groups simply 
disappeared. Given the fact that these groups are dormant and that they existed 
along certain informal structures, it is possible – indeed likely – that they could 
be mobilised with ease if circumstances so require.   
 
                                                
8 Interview with an Imam based in Nakuru, December 2008 
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25. Disarmament of these groups: Throughout the last quarter of 2008, there were 
reported instances of mopping up guns especially in North Rift Valley. Police 
records show that by the end of 2008, some 664 guns, 7,138 ammunition rounds 
and 174 explosive devices had been recovered. The government has ratified the 
Nairobi Protocol for the prevention, control and reduction of small arms and 
light weapons in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa but a domestic policy is 
yet to be put in place.  
 
26. The disarmament approach has been largely indistinguishable from the approach 
to dealing with ordinary problems of insecurity. This is notwithstanding the fact 
that these illegally armed groups represent a different (and more sophisticated) 
form of security threat. 
 
27. Three main challenges face the police in disbanding the illegal armed groups 
such as Mungiki. First is the difficulty of identifying members, especially 
because the groups have fluid organisational structures. For example, in 
Mungiki, informants said “most of them no longer keep dreadlocks which used 
to be their identification mark.”
9
 Furthermore, so many other people who are not 
members of the group wear dreadlocks.  
 
28. Secondly, the public does not cooperate with law enforcement agents in 
identifying suspected members of such groups for arrest and prosecution
10
 
because of fear of reprisals from the militia, often witnessed when they suspect 
someone has reported them to the police. 
 
29. Third, is the difficulty posed by politicisation of violence. Some politicians 
mobilise youth to act against their rivals for political gain. Respondents said 
“some politicians have been using Mungiki as their personal armies”
11
.  When 
there are no politicians to finance their operations, illegal groups turn to 
extortion. They “extort money just to provide an income to their members.”
12
 
 
30. It is disturbing that the UN Monitoring Group for Somalia reported in 
February/March 2008 that two containers loaded with illegal arms had been 
smuggled into the country during the post-election violence. The UN group 
identified the buyer as “a militia group in Kenya”.
 13
 Even though this was 
reported early in the year, no follow up action has been reported. It is likely that 
the illegal arms that the youth used during the post-election violence are still in 
the hands of these groups. This underscores the need for speed in addressing the 
factors that precipitated the crisis so that the social basis for the existence of 
these groups is effectively weakened.  
 
                                                
9 Interview with police officer, January 2009 
10 ibid 
11 Ibid 
12 Interview with a member conducted in Kibera, December 2008 
13 “Where are the guns?” Saturday Standard July 19 2008 
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ENHANCING SECURITY AND PROTECTION OF THE POPULATION 
 
Improving security 
 
31. The Government has built several police stations, police posts and patrol bases 
in areas affected by post-election violence, and in particular in those areas that 
witnessed the eviction of  people who became IDPs. The government also plans 
to double police recruitment to increase the police to population ratio. In 
addition, there has been ongoing capacity building through provision of training 
for the provincial administration on Peace Building and Conflict Management, 
among other efforts.  
32. In spite of these developments, many informants as well as respondents in the 
baseline survey point at insecurity as an issue of concern. In Nairobi, for 
instance, some landlords in the informal settlements of Kibera, Mathare and 
Huruma have not returned to their houses. Some were forcibly evicted and their 
houses taken up. An ethnic-based settlement pattern has evolved in some areas, 
making it difficult for landlords to collect rents, especially if their houses are 
located in areas predominantly settled by tenants from an ethnic group different 
from theirs. 
 
Non-partiality of security agencies 
 
33. Even though calm has returned to some of the areas from which IDPs were 
evicted, perceptions of police partiality in providing security for residents 
persist. For instance, some Mau residents feel police still favour one community 
over another.
14
 Some respondents in Uasin Gishu District expressed similar 
feelings. They observed that police stations are set up in areas inhabited by the 
one ethnic community and that officers from this community also man the 
stations.
15
 
34. Perceptions of partiality in how the police tackle insecurity in some of the areas 
that witnessed violence in the aftermath of the election require clear strategies to 
diminish their basis. 
 
Retaliatory violence 
 
35. Cases of retaliatory violence against IDPs continue to be reported. Leaflets 
warning families displaced by the post-election violence to leave Molo, 
Elburgon, Keringet, Kuresoi and Kamwaura divisions in the Rift Valley were 
circulated and found in November and December 2008. In late November 2008, 
unknown persons attacked the IDP camp at Githiriga in Molo at night, damaged 
property and then re-displaced the IDPs to another camp at Mungetho. 
 
 
                                                
14 Mau residents views in a focus group discussion, December 2008 
15 Uasin Gishu residents views in a focus group discussion, December 2008 
 9
36. These events suggest that the problem of insecurity is yet to be fully addressed. 
Lack of a coherent strategy in dealing with illegal armed groups, coupled with 
failure to promote reconciliation at the local level, undermines the people’s 
sense of security. Continued attacks on IDPs, no matter how sporadic or few, is 
a pointer to unresolved hostility, low inter-communal trust and the 
Government’s inability to guarantee its citizens’ safety. 
 
ENSURING THAT THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, PRESS FREEDOM AND THE RIGHT TO 
PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY ARE UPHELD 
 
37. During the post-election violence, as in any conflict situation, fundamental rights 
and freedoms were grossly violated. Agenda Item 1 emphasised the restoration 
and upholding of freedom of expression, press freedom, and the right to peaceful 
assembly as critical to ending the political crisis. 
 
38. Some progress was made in restoring some of these rights in the first quarter of 
2008 after the signing of the National Accord. For instance, the Government 
lifted the ban on live television and radio broadcasts. A Freedom of Information 
policy, which anchors media freedom and repeals the Official Secrets Act, 
which has been in the pipeline since 2007, is due for debate in Parliament, as is a 
Freedom of Information bill.  
 
39. However, the freedom of media has been constrained throughout the period. 
Some have even argued that Kenya’s democracy has been in recession following 
erosion of these rights. Freedom House in particular dropped Kenya’s 
classification from “free” to “partly free” in its ranking of countries and their 
respect for fundamental freedoms.
16
 
 
40. Freedom of assembly has been severely constrained. Citizens’ right to petition 
the Government has been challenged whenever it has been exercised. The police 
have violently dispersed protesting citizens in several urban areas. IDPs 
protesting against delays in the provision of assistance for resettlement and 
growing insecurity have been violently dispersed. Similarly, protests by civil 
society groups as well as the media were violently dispersed by the police. These 
incidences, on their own, are a pointer to slow or limited progress in restoring 
fundamental rights, and in particular, freedom of assembly. 
 
41.  The government is yet to enact laws that enhance freedom of information and 
legislate against hate speech. Fast-tracking these laws are critical. Urgent, 
however, is the need to fast track the constitutional review process, which will 
set the foundation for Kenya’s rights culture. 
 
 
 
                                                
16
 Freedom in the World Report (2008), accessible at www.freedomhouse.org 
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
42. Government’s efforts to disband the Mungiki and SLDF groups were not 
structured along the internationally accepted practices of disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration. The informal nature of illegally armed groups 
and the failure to establish the members or their sponsors has made it difficult to 
arrest and prosecute them.  
 
43. Some effort has gone into enhancing the security and protection of the 
population. However, the population is yet to feel the effects of these efforts as 
shown by respondents in the baseline survey as well as cases of retaliatory 
attacks by IDPs. Urgent measures to eliminate the perception of police bias in 
the performance of their duties are required, especially in areas affected by the 
post-election violence in order to restore the confidence of the public in law 
enforcement officers. 
 
44. Fundamental rights and freedoms are constrained; there is continued erosion of 
rights and gains made with respect to enjoyment of freedoms. Democracy is on 
recession compared to the period between 2003 and 2007. In order to safeguard 
fundamental freedoms of the media, as well as the freedom of assembly and 
association, an improved policy environment, linked to a new constitution is 
critical. The repeal of retrogressive laws and re-orienting law enforcement 
agencies needs to get under way with haste.  
 
45. Members of the KNDR mediation process will be required to demonstrate 
leadership in furthering these reforms. There is a need for them to publicly 
mobilise support for enjoyment of freedoms and rights at all times. It is critical 
that KNDR demand that others in government be held accountable when 
fundamental rights and freedoms are abused and/or neglected. Sensitising the 
two principals on the need to take leadership in giving directions on promotion 
and safequarding of rights and freedoms is important.  
 
46. In general comprehensive reforms and promotion of democratic governance is a 
must. Failure to reform would mean another violent conflict – the illegal armed 
groups will not be poorly equipped for a conflict in future.  
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The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) Monitoring Project 
 
Agenda Item 1 
 
Immediate Action to Stop Violence and Restore Fundamental Rights and Liberties 
 
Draft report on Status of Implementation 
 
(Draft Matrix on Progress) 
 
Objective Objectively 
Verifiable 
Indicators 
Required action Progress Remarks 
Violence halted  No. of incidents 
of political 
violence 
Government to stop 
any incidents of 
political violence. 
Hardly any reported cases of 
political violence 
This is a positive sign. However, Kenya is yet to 
witness political competition that would make use of 
political violence attractive. The referendum on a 
new constitution and another election would provide 
opportunity for political violence if institutional 
reforms are not undertaken.  
  No. of actions 
taken to stop 
political violence 
Enforce ban on illegal 
groups;  Government 
to carry out 
demobilisation and 
disbandment of militia 
and illegally armed 
groups;  Policy enacted 
to mop up illegal guns  
Police and Military launched a 
crackdown on the Mungiki and 
the Sabaot Land Defence Force; 
sporadic low-key mopping up of 
illegal arms carried out. 
Informal illegal groups could re-emerge – some 
could be dormant;  no policy on demobilisation of 
the militias 
 
There is need to operationalise the Nairobi Protocol 
for the prevention, control and reduction of small 
arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes and the 
Horn of Africa. 
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Fundamental 
rights restored 
No. of incidents 
that violate the 
fundamental 
rights and 
freedom of 
expression 
Government to 
guarantee and respect 
citizens fundamental 
rights and freedom of 
expression 
There have been cases of police 
violently dispersing civilian 
demonstrations aimed at 
petitioning the Government  
Respect of fundamental rights of association and 
freedom of expression is on decline. 
  No. of incidents 
that violate press 
freedom. 
Government to 
guarantee and respect 
press freedom 
The President advised the 
Attorney General to look into the 
concerns raised (especially 
allegations that the law would 
curtail press freedom) by the 
stakeholders regarding the  
Communications of Kenya 
(Amendment) Act, 2008  
The government should address the concerns raised 
regarding the law and put in place measures to 
promote independence and freedom of the media. 
 
Harmonious relationship needs to be cultivated 
between the media fraternity and government to fast-
track the reform agenda 
  No. of incidents 
that violate the 
freedom of 
peaceful 
assembly 
Government to 
guarantee and respect 
freedom of peaceful 
assembly 
The police have continued to 
violently disperse civilian 
demonstrations aimed to petition 
the Government and other duty 
bearers 
The Government needs to put in place measures to 
guarantee the freedom of assembly. 
  No. of enabling 
legislation 
enacted 
Parliament to enact 
relevant laws to 
guarantee fundamental 
rights of expression 
and press 
Communications Act (1998) is 
being reviewed 
Relevant laws are not yet passed 
 
